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The Federal Courts and the Enforcement
of Foreign Arbitral Awards
I. Introduction
The Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of
Foreign Arbitral Awards (Convention)1 is designed to achieve
uniform interpretation of, and certainty in, the enforcement of
foreign arbitral awards.2 The federal courts of the United States
have liberally interpreted the provisions of the Convention- to
achieve this goal, primarily through a narrow construction of its
defenses. There is, however, an area of substantial confusion, be-
cause the federal courts have failed to decide if the defenses of
the Federal Arbitration Act (Act)," which covers domestic arbi-
tral awards, apply in cases arising under the Convention.5 This
uncertainty has the potential to undermine the effectiveness of
the Convention.6
Many factors account for the narrow construction of the de-
fenses allowed under the Convention.7 Courts consistently recog-
nize that Congress has expressed a clear legislative intent to
favor enforcement of foreign arbitral awards." The history of the
Convention and its express language also support a liberal inter-
1. Opened for signature June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, T.I.A.S. No. 6997, 330
U.N.T.S. 38 [hereinafter cited as Convention].
2. See A. VAN DEN BERG, THE NEw YORK ARBITRATION ComNVENrIO oF 1958 1 (1981)
(discussing the detrimental effect which uncertainty can have on the Convention).
3. In the United States, only the federal courts have decided cases arising under the
Convention because suits have either been initiated in federal court or parties have exer-
cised their right to remove any proceeding arising under the Convention to the federal
courts. See 9 U.S.C. § 205 (1982).
4. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1982). The Federal Arbitration Act [hereinafter cited as Act]
does not cover arbitration awards rendered outside the United States.
5. See infra notes 205-13 and accompanying text.
6. Id.
7. See Convention, supra note 1, art. V; see also infra notes 87-196 and accompany-
ing text for discussion of the Convention defenses. The defenses of the Convention are
found in article V.
8. See Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 520 n.15 (1974); Parsons & Whit-
temore Overseas Co. v. Societe Generale de L'Industrie du Papier, 508 F.2d 969, 974 (2d
Cir. 1974). See infra notes 87-191 and accompanying text.
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pretation of its provisions." Finally, the federal courts recognize
that parochial decisions, which undermine the effectiveness of
foreign arbitral awards, might invite retaliation from the courts
of other nations when they review awards rendered in the
United States.10
This Comment surveys the federal court decisions on en-
forcement of foreign arbitral awards under the Convention."
Part II of this Comment traces the background of the Conven-
tion and outlines its major features. Part III surveys and ana-
lyzes the key federal court decisions interpreting the Conven-
tion. Part IV discusses the unresolved issues under the
Convention. Part V examines the current trend in the federal
courts. Part VI concludes that the Convention, despite some un-
resolved issues, has been an effective means to enforce foreign
arbitral awards in the United States.
II. Background
A. Why Arbitration?
In international commercial transactions, arbitration has
become an "almost universal" means of dispute resolution"2 and
the Convention is the "cornerstone of this procedure."" It has
succeeded in establishing an attractive method for the enforce-
ment of foreign arbitral awards. The availability of the Conven-
tion's simpler and more effective procedures has been a vital fac-
tor in the increasing use of arbitration."
Parties to an international commercial transaction prefer
resolving their difficulties through arbitration rather than resort-
ing to the courts of one of the parties. They believe that arbitra-
tion offers a private, less expensive, and swifter method of set-
tling disputes."' Arbitration is also viewed as providing an
amicable means of resolving problems, which is less likely to im-
9. See infra notes 40-52 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 87-89 and accompanying text.
11. Although the Convention covers enforcement of agreements to arbitrate, this
Comment does not analyze the decisions in this area.
12. Kerr, International Arbitration v. Litigation, 1980 J. Bus. L. 164.
13. A. VAN DEN BERG, supra note 2, at 1.
14. Kerr, supra note 12, at 167.
15. Id. at 164-65.
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pair future business relationships." The arbiters are experts in
the field of international commerce and are better able to decide
complex commercial issues. 17 Most important, the availability of
international commercial arbitration affords all parties a neutral
mode of dispute resolution.1 8 There is no need to rely on the law
of an unfamiliar forum or to fear local prejudice against a for-
eign litigant.'9 Parties can use the services of nonpartisan pri-
vate arbitration groups.2 0
In spite of these benefits, some critics contend, however,
that arbitration is not uniformly advantageous.2' The procedure
can be costly, slow-moving and cumbersome. Arbitrators are
usually individuals of stature in the field of commerce, who com-
mand substantial fees.2 2 Their schedules are very busy, which
causes delay. Most important, arbitration lacks a procedure to
bring related disputes under one arbitral proceeding.24
B. The Pre-Convention Period
During the formative period of international commercial ar-
bitration, 25 domestic arbitration laws were the only source of law
16. Id.; Comment, International Commercial Arbitration under the United Nations
Convention and the Amended Federal Arbitration Statute, 47 WAsH. L. REv. 441, 442
(1971) (citing Gardner, Economic and Political Implications of International Commer-
cial Arbitration, INT'L. TRADE ARB., 15, 16-17 (1958)) [hereinafter cited as Comment,
International Arbitration].
17. See A. VAN DEN BERG, supra note 2, at 1; Kerr, supra note 12, at 176.
18. A. VAN DEN BERG, supra note 2, at 1 (suggesting that arbitration allows parties to
decide in advance what procedural and substantive laws will be applied in any dispute).
The author cites this as a clear advantage of arbitration. Id.
19. See Quigley, Accession by the United States to the United Nations Convention
on the Recognition of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 70 YALE L.J. 1049, 1051 (1960). There is
a basic fear that a court of one party's nation would be more likely to favor its own
citizens. Whether this fear is justified does not matter because parties believe that favor-
itism exists. Id.
20. The two large private arbitration groups are the American Arbitration Associa-
tion (AAA) located in the United States, and the International Chamber of Commerce
(ICC) based in Geneva, Switzerland. Both groups have their own rules and procedures,
which govern arbitrations submitted to them.
21. See, e.g., Kerr, supra note 12, at 164-66.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 177. Kerr notes that although it is inevitable, arbitration is not preferable
to litigation. Id.
25. The genesis of international commercial arbitration is the start of the 20th cen-
tury. A. VAN DEN BERG, supra note 2, at 6.
3
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governing the enforcement of arbitral clauses and arbitral
awards.26 These laws were generally antiquated and unfavorable
to arbitration.2 7 They lacked uniformity and were at times, ap-
plied by courts that viewed arbitration as a rival to judicial
authority. 8
In response to the increased use of international commercial
arbitration in the post-World War I period, the League of Na-
tions developed a multilateral treaty known as the Geneva Pro-
tocol on Arbitration Clauses of 1923 (Protocol)."' The Protocol's
primary objective was to provide a uniform and effective means
of enforcing arbitration clauses.3 Following the Protocol, the
Geneva Convention on the Execution of Foreign Awards of
192781 was established to regulate "the enforcement of arbitral
awards made in pursuance of an arbitration agreement falling
under the Geneva Protocol of 1923. ''s2 Both of these multilateral
agreements sought to encourage the use of international com-
mercial arbitration and to standardize the procedures of
enforcement. 8
The Geneva Treaties were an improvement over the patch-
work of domestic arbitral laws. Nevertheless, they were inade-
quate because they did not facilitate international commercial
arbitration as an inexpensive and predictable method of dispute
resolution.3 4 Both treaties placed the burden of proof at an en-
forcement proceeding on the party who had succeeded in arbi-
tration. 5 Having to prove one's case twice in order to enforce an
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id. The Geneva Protocol on Arbitration Clauses of 1923 was adopted Sept. 24,
1923, 27 L.N.T.S. 158 [hereinafter cited as Protocol].
30. See, A. VAN DEN BERG, supra note 2, at 6.
31. Adopted Sept. 26, 1927, 92 L.N.T.S. 301 [hereinafter cited as Geneva
Convention].
32. A. VAN DEN BERG, supra note 2, at 7. For further discussion of the Geneva Trea-
ties, see id. at 113-18. The United States did not accede to either treaty.
33. Quigley, supra note 19, at 1054-55 n.30; the Protocol only governed enforcement
of arbitral clauses while the Geneva Convention governed enforcement of arbitral
awards. Id.
34. See A. VAN DEN BERG, supra note 2, at 7. The inadequacies of these treaties were
the primary reason for the drafting and ratification of the Convention. Id at 113-18.
35. See Quigley, supra note 33, at 1054-55; A. VAN DEN BERG, supra note 2, at 7.
Another limitation on the effectiveness of the Geneva Treaties was their limited scope:
[Vol. 5:151
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arbitration award, discouraged use of the procedure.36 The Con-
vention was drafted in order to eliminate this, and other
problems which had been left unresolved under the Treaties."
C. The Convention
In 1958, representatives of many nations met in New York
under the sponsorship of the United Nations to devise a more
effective means to enforce international arbitration agreements
and awards. Ten nations signed the resulting United Nations
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Ar-
bitral Awards. 8 This Convention replaced the earlier Geneva
Treaties" and has subsequently been adopted by almost all of
the important trading nations of the capitalist, socialist and de-
veloping spheres of the world.40
The goal of the Convention is clear and easily stated. It
the parties had to be subject to the jurisdiction of different contracting states, and the
award had to be made in a contracting state. Id.
36. See Quigley, supra note 33, at 1054.
37. See A. VAN DEN BERG, supra note 2, at 7. They hoped to have an arbitration
process that was not governed by national laws. Id.
38. The 10 signatories are:
Belgium Israel
Costa Rica Jordan
El Salvador Netherlands
Federal Republic of Germany Philippines
India Poland
39. Convention, supra note 1, art. VII (2) states: "The Geneva Protocol on Arbitra-
tion Clauses of 1923 and the Geneva Convention on the Execution of Foreign Arbitral
Awards of 1927 shall cease to have effect between Contracting States on their becoming
bound, and to the extent that they become bound by this Convention."
40.. A. VAN DEN BERG, supra note 2, at 410. The adopting nations are:
Australia Egypt Kampuchea South Africa
Austria Finland Korea Spain
Belgium France Kuwait Sri Lanka
Benin Germany DR Madagascar Sweden
Botswana Germany FR Mexico Switzerland
Bulgaria Ghana Morocco Syrian Arab
Byelorussia Greece Netherlands Thailand
Central African Holy See Niger Trinidad and Tobago
Chile Hungary Nigeria Tunisia
Columbia India Norway Ukranian SSR
Cuba Israel Philippines USSR
Czechoslovakia Italy Poland United Kingdom
Denmark Japan Romania United Rep. of Tanzania
Ecuador Jordan San Marino United States
5
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strives to establish the "necessary legal framework" on an inter-
national scale to permit the successful use of commercial arbi-
tration among foreign parties.' 1 The Convention sets up a sim-
ple, standard procedure to enforce foreign arbitral awards in
contracting states. To achieve this goal, the Convention limits
the defenses available to a party who opposes the recognition of
an arbitral award.'2 In addition, the Convention requires all con-
tracting states to establish procedures for enforcing foreign arbi-
tral awards that are at least as advantageous as procedures for
enforcing domestic arbitral awards.'3
A party who opposes the recognition of an international ar-
bitral award is limited by article V" of the Convention to seven
defenses. The defenses are: the party was denied due process,'5
the subject of the award was a nonarbitrable matter,' 6 the par-
ties lacked capacity to agree,47 the arbitral procedure was not in
compliance with the parties' agreement,' the arbitral award was
not binding,'49 the dispute was not properly submitted to the ar-
bitration tribunal,50 and a public policy of the enforcing forum
prohibited enforcement of the award.51 The public policy de-
41. A. VAN DEN BERG, supra note 2, at 1.
42. Convention, supra note 1, art. V (limiting the number of defenses that are al-
lowed under the Convention to those it enumerates). For a survey and analysis of how
federal courts have interpreted these defenses, see infra notes 87-191 and accompanying
text.
43. See Convention, supra note 1, art. III (requiring contracting states not to place
more onerous limitations upon a party seeking enforcement of a foreign arbitral award
than it would upon an arbitral award rendered within its borders).
44. Convention, supra note 1, art. V. Article V provides: "Recognition and enforce-
ment of the award may be refused, at the request of the party against whom it is in-
voked, only if that party furnished. . . proof [of the defenses enumerated in Article V]."
Id.
45. Convention, supra note 1, art. V(1)(b). See infra notes 99-106 and accompany-
ing text.
46. Convention, supra note 1, art. V(2)(a). See infra notes 138-55 and accompanying
text.
47. Convention, supra note 1, art. V(1)(a). See infra notes 193-94 and accompanying
text.
48. Convention, supra note 1, art. V(1)(d). See infra notes 193-94 and accompany-
ing text.
49. Convention, supra note 1, art. V(1)(e). See infra notes 123-37 and accompanying
text.
50. Convention, supra note 1, art. V(1)(c). See infra notes 107-22 and accompanying
text.
51. Convention, supra note 1, art.V(2)(b). See infra notes 156-92 and accompanying
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol5/iss1/5
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fense has the greatest potential for obstructing the enforcement
of arbitration awards because of its vagueness. Courts have
avoided this pitfall by construing this defense strictly.2
D. The United States and the Convention
The United States did not sign the Convention until 1970.53
Before then, parties seeking to enforce foreign arbitral awards in
the United States experienced great difficulty. The federal
courts were able to afford only limited relief." Jurisdiction over
the parties to an international arbitration agreement could be
asserted based on the existence of a bilateral treaty of friend-
ship, or a commerce and navigation treaty with the nation where
the arbitral award had originated.55 The United States did not,
however, have such a bilateral treaty with every country. Fur-
thermore, although the existence of a bilateral treaty gave the
federal courts subject matter jurisdiction, there were no guide-
lines for the resolution of disputes over the validity of the arbi-
tral award itself. This resulted in an ad hoc method of enforce-
ment which lacked speed and predictability. 6
The state courts did not offer a viable alternative. No state
had an arbitration statute that specifically covered enforcement
of an award rendered in a foreign country.57 A party's only re-
course in state court was to bring a common law action .5 Conse-
quently, neither the state nor the federal court systems afforded
much relief to a party who wished to enforce an arbitration
award granted in another country.
When the United States acceded to the Convention in
text.
52. See, e.g., Parsons & Whittemore Overseas Co. v. Societe Generale de L'Industrie
du Papier, 508 F.2d 969 (2d Cir. 1974). See infra notes 161-73 and accompanying text.
53. See 9 U.S.C. § 201 (1982).
54. See generally Comment, International Arbitration, supra note 14, at 444 n.11
(citing Oregon Pac. Forest Prod. Corp. v. Welsh Panel Co., 248 F. Supp. 903 (D.C. Or.
1965); Batson Yarn & Fabrics Mach. Group Inc. v. Saurer-Allma GmbH-Allgauer Mas-
chinebau, 311 F. Supp. 68 (D.S.C. 1970)).
55. Some of these treaties had provisions that provided for judicial enforcement of
arbitral awards. Comment, International Arbitration, supra note 16, at 444.
56. See id. at 444-45.
57. See Quigley, supra note 19, at 1057.
58. Id. at 1057-58.
1984]
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1970,19 it incorporated the Convention as part of federal
law. 0 In so doing, the United States invoked the only two reser-
vations a country may use to qualify its accession.6 These reser-
vations provide, that an enforcing state may apply the Conven-
tion solely to awards made in other contracting states, and solely
to legal relationships that are defined as commercial under its
own laws.2 The definition of commercial transactions developed
in the United States excluded matters involving domestic rela-
tions and political arbitral awards. 3
Congress passed implementing legislation that complements
the Convention" and establishes a flexible framework for apply-
ing its enforcement procedures in the United States.65 The Con-
59. The United States delegates to the 1958 New York convention recommended
that the United States not sign the agreement. These delegates believed that the Con-
vention was a threat to the powers of the states in arbitration and would adversely affect
the procedures of state and federal courts. Further, the delegates believed that the prin-
ciples embodied in the Convention were not desirable for the United States. Id. at 1074-
75 n.108 (citing U.S. Del. Rep. 22); contra 1970 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 3601, 3601
(referring to opinions of the ABA, AAA, and many executive agencies, all of which called
for United States accession to the Convention).
60. The Convention is codified in chapter two of the Federal Arbitration Act, 9
U.S.C. §§ 201-208 (1982).
61. See 9 U.S.C. § 202 (1982).
62. See Convention, supra note 1, art. I § 3. The Convention provides: "[an enforc-
ing state] may also declare that it will apply the Convention only to differences arising
out of legal relationships whether contractual or not, which are considered as commercial
under the national law of the State making such declaration." Id.
These restrictions qualify the broad scope of the Convention, contained in article I §
1. This section provides:
This Convention shall apply to the recognition and enforcement of arbitral
awards made in the territory of a State other than the State where the recognition
and enforcement of such awards are sought, and arising out of differences between
persons, whether physical or legal. It shall also apply to arbitral awards not con-
sidered as domestic awards in the State where their recognition and enforcement
are sought.
Convention, supra note 1, art. I § 1.
63. See Island Territory of Curacao v. Solitron Devices, Inc., 356 F. Supp. 1, 13
(S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 489 F.2d 1313 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 986 (1974). This
was one of the first cases in the United States to interpret the Convention. For further
discussion see infra notes 93-97 and accompanying text.
64. 9 U.S.C. § 201 (1982) states that the Convention is part of federal law. Sections
202-208 lay out the necessary framework to implement the Convention and will be dis-
cussed in the text. See infra text accompanying notes 65-69.
65. 9 U.S.C. § 202 (1982) states:
An arbitration agreement or arbitral award arising out of a legal relationship,
whether contractual or not, which is considered as commercial, including a trans-
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol5/iss1/5
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vention has a broad scope; it is inapplicable only to disputes be-
tween United States citizens who lack a reasonable relationship
with a foreign state."' A reasonable relationship exists if the dis-
pute concerns property located abroad, performance of a con-
tract in another country, or any other reasonable nexus with one
or more foreign nations. 7 The Convention also applies to arbi-
tral awards rendered in the United States, which involve a dis-
puted commercial transaction between foreign parties. 8
Congress expressed a clear policy favoring federal court ju-
risdiction over matters involving international commercial arbi-
tration. 9 The federal courts have original jurisdiction over all
actions arising under the Convention,7 0 regardless of the amount
in controversy.7 1 A defendant may remove any matter arising
under the Convention from state court to the federal district
court which has jurisdiction. 9 By allowing liberal access to the
action, contract, or agreement described in section 2 of this title, falls under the
Convention. An agreement or award arising out of such a relationship which is
entirely between citizens of the United States shall be deemed not to fall under
the Convention unless that relationship involves property located abroad, envis-
ages performance or enforcement abroad, or has some other reasonable relation
with one or more foreign states. For the purpose of this section a corporation is a
citizen of the United States if it is incorporated or has its principal place of busi-
ness in the United States.
66. See id.
67. See id. The jurisdiction of the Convention is very open ended and leaves the
courts with wide discretion in deciding whether the Convention is applicable.
68. See infra notes 214-24 and accompanying text. This interpretation is not uni-
form in the United States and is one of the few drawbacks of federal court interpretation
to date. Id.
69. See 9 U.S.C. § 203 (1982). Section 203 provides:
An action or proceeding falling under the Convention shall be deemed to arise
under the laws and treaties of the United States. The district courts of the United
States (including the courts enumerated in section 460 of title 28) shall have origi-
nal jurisdiction over such an action or proceeding, regardless of the amount in
controversy.
Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. 9 U.S.C. § 205 (1982). The section states:
Where the subject matter of an action or proceeding pending in a state court
relates to an arbitration agreement or award falling under the Convention, the
defendant or the defendants may, at any time before the trial thereof, remove
such action or proceeding to the district court of the United States for the district
and division embracing the place where the action or proceeding is pending. The
procedure for removal of causes otherwise provided by law shall apply, except that
9
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federal courts, Congress effectively limited state court involve-
ment in the field of international commercial arbitration. This
preference reflects a desire to create a uniform body of law gov-
erning the recognition of foreign arbitral awards.
The venue requirements for proceedings brought under the
Convention are stated in section 204.7s Parties may stipulate the
venue for court proceedings in their arbitration agreement.
Venue may also lie in the court where disputes about the subject
matter of the arbitration could have been litigated. 4
Congress also provided that the recognition and enforce-
ment proceedings under the Convention would be governed by
the Federal Arbitration Act,7 5 unless its provisions conflict with
the Convention.76 The Federal Arbitration Act, which had previ-
ously applied exclusively to domestic arbitral awards, now sup-
plies the motion procedure in federal courts for recognizing and
enforcing foreign arbitral awards. 7 This simplifies enforcement
and complies with article III of the Convention, which demands
that enforcement of domestic and foreign awards be placed on
an almost equal footing.78
the ground for removal provided in this section need not appear on the face of the
complaint but may be shown in the petition for removal. For the purposes of
Chapter 1 of this title any action or proceeding removed under this section shall
be deemed to have been brought in the district court to which it is removed.
Id.
73. 9 U.S.C § 204 (1982). The section states:
An action or proceeding over which the district courts have jurisdiction pur-
suant to section 203 of this title may be brought in any such court in which save
for the arbitration agreement an action or proceeding with respect to the contro-
versy between the parties could be brought, or in such court for the district and
division which embraces the place designated in the agreement as the place of
arbitration if such place is within the United States.
Id.
74. Id.
75. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1982). The Act is the domestic predecessor to the Convention.
76. The relevant statute states: "Chapter 1 applies to actions and proceedings
brought under this chapter to the extent that chapter is not in conflict with this chapter
or the Convention as ratified by the United States." 9 U.S.C. § 208 (1982).
77. See id., Convention, supra note 1, art. III.
78. Convention, supra note 1, art. III states:
Each Contracting State shall recognize arbitral awards as binding and enforce
them in accordance with the rules of procedure of the territory where the award is
relied upon, under the conditions laid down in the following articles. There shall
not be imposed substantially more onerous conditions or higher fees or charges on
the recognition or enforcement of arbitral awards to which this Convention applies
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol5/iss1/5
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E. The Procedure in the United States
Article IV of the Convention permits a court to hear a mo-
tion requesting recognition of a foreign arbitral award7 9 if the
party seeking enforcement has met two requirements."0 He must
present the duly authenticated original award or a certified
copy, and the original arbitration agreement or a certified
copy.81 The party opposing recognition may then attempt to
prove one or more of the defenses permitted under the Conven-
tion.82 If the party who objects to recognition fails to meet his
burden of proof, the court will convert the award into a
judgment.83
In the United States, an arbitral award is an inchoate right
until converted into a judgment by a court." The Federal Arbi-
than are imposed on the recognition or enforcement of domestic arbitral awards.
"Confirmation" is the term used in the Act, 9 U.S.C. § 9 (1982), and has the same
meaning that "recognition" does under the Convention. Both describe the motion prac-
tice in which arbitral awards, foreign or domestic, are converted into judicial judgments
enforceable in all United States courts. "Recognition" will be the term used in this Com-
ment because it is used in the Convention. Courts, however, use both terms interchange-
ably in their opinions.
79. See Imperial Ethiopian Gov't v. Baruch-Foster Corp., 535 F.2d 334, 335 (5th Cir.
1976) ("[T]he implementing legislation prescribed a summary procedure in the nature of
federal motion practice to expedite petitions for confirmations of foreign arbitral
awards.").
80. Convention, supra note 1, art. IV. Article IV states:
1. To obtain the recognition and enforcement mentioned in the preceding ar-
ticle, the party applying for recognition and enforcement shall, at the time of the
application, supply-
(a) The duly authenticated original award or a duly certified copy
thereof;
(b) The original agreement referred to in article if or a duly certified
copy thereof.
2. If the said award or agreement is not made in an official language of the
country in which the award is relied upon, the party applying for recognition and
enforcement of the award shall produce a translation of these documents into such
language. The translation shall be certified by an official or sworn translator or by
a diplomatic or consular agent.
Id.
81. Id. art. IV (1). See supra note 80.
82. See Convention, supra note 1, art. V(1) (which places burden of proof on party
opposed to recognition).
83. See 9 U.S.C. § 207 (1982), which states: "The court shall confirm the award
unless it finds one of the grounds for refusal or deferral of recognition or enforcement of
the award specified in the said Convention."
84. Fotochrome, Inc. v. Copal Co., 517 F.2d 512, 516 (2d Cir. 1975).
11
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tration Act, which governs both foreign and domestic awards,
contains the motion procedure parties must use to convert arbi-
tral awards into judgments."' It is important to note that the
motion procedure is strictly limited to recognition or nonrecog-
nition of the award. It cannot be used to initiate an original ac-
tion or to include counterclaims.8 6
III. United States Federal Courts and Defenses of the
Convention
The federal courts have consistently favored enforcement of
foreign arbitral awards because they narrowly construe the de-
fenses permitted by the Convention. 7 Motivation for this policy
stems from a fear that, were American courts to proceed differ-
ently, foreign courts would respond by dishonoring arbitral
awards rendered in this country.88 The pro-enforcement policy
of the federal courts is responsive to the primary goals of the
Convention, which are to simplify and standardize enforcement
procedures across the globe while minimizing the possibility of
This Comment discusses and analyzes the enforcement of arbitral awards in the
United States. This is the final stage in the arbitration process. It is preceded by: (a) an
agreement to arbitrate disputes, which arise in an international commercial transaction;
(b) a dispute, which is submitted to arbitration; (c) an arbitration hearing that renders
an award; (d) a successful party who seeks recovery of his award; (e) a party who is
unable to recover his award through voluntary compliance and invokes the Convention's
recognition and enforcement provisions. In the United States, recognition (confirmation)
is the judicial process to convert an arbitral award into a judgment, which is enforceable
in this country. Recognition and enforcement are available upon the filing of the appro-
priate motions.
85. See 9 U.S.C. § 6 (1982). This section provides: "Any application to the court
hereunder shall be made and heard in the manner provided by law for the making and
hearing of motions, except as otherwise herein expressly provided." Id.
86. Fertilizer Corp. of India v. IDI Management, Inc. (FCI), 517 F. Supp. 948, 963
(S.D. Ohio 1981). The court reviewed the requirements of the Act, 9 U.S.C. § 6, and
found that a counterclaim could not be "interposed in response to a motion. Further-
more, a confirmation proceeding is not an original action; it is, rather, in the nature of a
post-judgment enforcement proceeding. In such a proceeding a counterclaim is clearly
inappropriate." Id. This procedure is not in conflict with the Convention and therefore is
applicable. See 9 U.S.C. § 208 (1982).
87. The defenses allowed by the Convention are available to parties in enforcement
of arbitral clause proceedings and in hearings on recognition of foreign arbitral awards.
See Convention, supra note 1, art. I. Part III focuses on the federal court interpretations
of the defenses allowed by the Convention, as used by parties seeking to defeat recogni-
tion of a foreign arbitral award.
88. See infra notes 171-73 and accompanying text.
12http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol5/iss1/5
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parochial prejudices. 89 To this end, the Convention established
clear procedures and limited defenses.
A. Defining Commercial Relationships
The United States signed the Convention with the reserva-
tion that it would only apply to legal relationships that it recog-
nized as commercial. 0 The claim that a relationship is not com-
mercial is not actually a defense under the Convention. Rather,
it seeks to establish that the Convention does not apply. If suc-
cessful, such an assertion might leave the party seeking recogni-
tion without effective recourse in this country. Unable to seek
enforcement under the Convention, he would also be denied re-
lief through the procedures of the Federal Arbitration Act, be-
cause they apply only to domestic arbitral awards.91 Such a
party could only rely on the ineffective common law causes of
action that were available before the United States acceded to
the Convention.2
In one of the first cases in the United States under the Con-
vention, the District Court for the Southern District of New
York was called upon to define a commercial legal relationship.
The district court confronted this threshold issue in Island Ter-
ritory of Curacao v. Solitron Devices, Inc.93 The case involved a
contract between a manufacturer and the sovereign nation of
Curacao.94 Curacao had prevailed at arbitration95 and sought en-
forcement of the arbitral award. Solitron took the position that
its relationship with Curacao was not commercial because its
89. See infra notes 156-201 and accompanying text.
90. See supra notes 61-63 and accompanying text.
91. 9 U.S.C. § 1 (1982).
92. See supra text accompanying notes 54-58.
93. 356 F. Supp. 1 (S.D.N.Y.), affd on other grounds, 489 F.2d 1313 (2d Cir. 1973),
cert. denied, 416 U.S. 986 (1974). The Second Circuit held that because the award was
enforceable under N.Y. Civ. PRAc. R. 53 (McKinney 1973), there was no need to decide
the correctness of the district court's decision regarding the applicability of the Conven-
tion. Island Territory of Curacao v. Solitron Devices, Inc., 489 F.2d 1313, 1323 (2d Cir.
1973).
94. The contract was for the construction and maintenance of an electronics plant
and included an arbitration clause. When a dispute arose because of a change in the
Island's minimum wage scale, Solitron discontinued performance and Curacao went to
arbitration. Curacao won. Solitron, 356 F. Supp. at 4.
95. The arbitration took place in Curacao. Id. at 3.
1984)
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contract obligations involved performing a governmental
act - construction of an industrial park. 6 The district court
ruled against Solitron, holding that its contract was clearly com-
mercial9 7 and that the only awards falling outside the meaning
of that term are "matrimonial and other domestic relations
awards, political awards, and the like.""8 Since Solitron was de-
cided in 1973, the claim that a relationship is not commercial
apparently has not been raised in the federal courts. Presuma-
bly, the district court's broad definition of "commercial" in Soli-
tron renders the possibility of success on such a claim very slim.
B. The Due Process Defense
The due process defense99 incorporates the standards for
due process that have been developed by the forum nation. 100 In
the United States, the federal courts have limited this challenge
to two allegations. A party may oppose recognition of an arbitral
award by raising the defense that he failed to receive proper no-
tice of the arbitration proceeding or by arguing that he lacked
an opportunity to be heard by the arbiters.10 1 The Second Cir-
cuit, in a very influential decision, examined this defense in Par-
sons & Whittemore Overseas Co. v. Societe Generale de
L'Industrie du Papier.102 The party opposing recognition
claimed that the arbitral tribunal improperly refused to delay its
proceedings to accommodate the speaking schedule of an impor-
tant witness.103 Parsons held that due process was satisfied if all
96. Id. at 13.
97. Id. at 13-14.
98. Id. at 13.
99. Convention, supra note 1, art. V(1)(b) states: "The party against whom the
award is invoked was not given proper notice of the appointment of the arbitrator or of
the arbitration proceedings or was otherwise unable to present his case . ..."
100. See Parsons & Whittemore Overseas Co. v. Societe Generale de L'Industrie du
Papier, 508 F.2d 969, 975 (2d Cir. 1974) (The court states that article V(1)(b) of the
Convention "sanctions the application of the forum state's standards of due process.").
See also Quigley, supra note 33, at 1067 n.81.
101. See Parsons, 508 F.2d at 975. This defense was one of many that the Parsons
court had to examine. See also Biotronik Mess-und Therapiegeraete GmbH & Co. v.
Medford Medical Instrument Co., 415 F. Supp. 133, 140 (D.N.J. 1976) (holding that the
"primary elements of due process are notice of the proceedings and the opportunity to
be heard thereon").
102. 508 F.2d 969 (2d Cir. 1974).
103. Id. at 975.
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parties had notice and an opportunity to be heard. 104 The Sec-
ond Circuit noted that the tribunal's refusal to grant a delay did
not violate the notions of fundamental fairness. 10 5 The logistical
problems of scheduling hearings for parties, attorneys, and arbi-
trators located around the world means a participant may not be
able to participate in arbitral proceedings. If this occurs, it does
not constitute a reason to deny recognition and enforcement of
an award. 10 6 Inability to produce a witness is a risk inherent in
arbitration. A party seeking to defeat recognition on due process
grounds in the federal courts confronts an almost insurmounta-
ble task. The arbitration proceeding would have to have been
blatantly fraudulent to result in a denial of recognition of the
award.
C. The Submission Defense
The submission defense10 7 involves a claim that the arbitra-
tor has exceeded his authority by deciding issues that the parties
had not presented for determination. This defense requires that
a court actually review the arbitrator's exercise of authority. 08 It
104. See, e.g., id. at 975-76; see also Biotronik, 415 F. Supp. at 140-41.
105. Parsons, 508 F.2d at 975-76. The court rejected this claim because: (a) a party
gives up his courtroom rights when he agrees to arbitration; and (b) the witness' excuse
for not appearing was unacceptable to the court (he or she had a prior speaking engage-
ment). The court held there was no violation of fundamental fairness by the arbitral
tribunal's decision to refuse to grant a delay. This was bolstered by the fact that the
tribunal had the witness' affidavit. Id. at 975-76.
106. See, e.g., Libyan American Oil Co. v. Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahirya
(LIAMCO), 482 F. Supp. 1175, 1176 (D.D.C. 1980) (Libya refusing to participate in the
arbitration based upon a sovereign immunity theory); Ipitrade Int'l, S.A. v. Federal Re-
public of Nigeria, 465 F. Supp. 824 (D.D.C. 1978) (Nigeria refusing to participate in the
arbitration based upon a sovereign immunity theory); Biotronik, 415 F. Supp. at 140-41
(Medford refusing to participate).
107. Convention, supra note 1, art. V(1)(c) states:
The award deals with a difference not contemplated by or not falling within
the terms of the submission to arbitration or it contains decisions on matters be-
yond the scope of the submission to arbitration, provided that, if the decisions on
matters submitted to arbitration can be separated from those not so submitted,
that part of the award which contain decisions on matters submitted to arbitra-
tion may be recognized and enforced ....
108. See, e.g., Parsons, 508 F.2d at 976-77 (opposing party alleged that arbitrators
improperly awarded damages for loss of production); Fertilizer Corp. of India v. IDI
Management, Inc., 517 F. Supp. 948, 959-61 (S.D. Ohio 1981) (opposing party alleged
arbitrators improperly awarded consequential damages) [hereinafter cited as FCI];
Amoco Overseas Oil Co. v. Astir Navigation Co., 490 F. Supp. 32, 36-38 (S.D.N.Y. 1979)
15
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is a direct challenge to the propriety of his judgment. By con-
trast, the other defenses involve a review of factors that do not
pertain as directly to the substantive validity of the award."' 9
Parties asserting the submission defense in the federal
courts have not prevailed. The federal courts have consistently
given this defense a narrow construction, holding that an arbi-
trator's decision is justified if any rational basis can be found for
it.110 They have indicated that the pro-enforcement thrust of the
Convention requires a narrow construction."' They also cite an
identical defense provided by the Federal Arbitration Act that
invites a "strict reading.""1
The arbitrator's award will be recognized provided that the
parties have been given a full and fair hearing, and the courts
can find a colorable justification for the decision."3 A decision
will be denied recognition only if it is characterized by irration-
ality.1"4 Thus, when faced with a challenge that the arbiter has
exceeded his authority, the federal courts will generally not sec-
ond guess his construction of the parties' agreement.'1  The
strong presumption that the arbitrator has acted within his au-
thority1 6 makes it unlikely the submission defense will succeed.
(issue of arbitrator's decision awarding consequential damages for conversion and attor-
ney's fees).
It should be noted that the submission defense has been compared to the § 10(d)
defense of the Act, which involves the claim that the arbitrators have exceeded their
powers. See id.
109. Examples of defenses involving factors peripheral to the arbitrator's findings
are the due process defense of article V(1)(b), which involves the requirements of notice,
and the noncommercial defense, which questions the applicability of the Convention to a
recognition hearing on the enforcing nation.
110. See Parsons, 508 F.2d at 977; FCI, 517 F. Supp. at 959-61; Amoco, 490 F. Supp.
at 36-38.
111. Parsons, 508 F.2d at 976. This principle was also followed by the court in FCI,
517 F. Supp. at 960.
112. Parsons, 508 F.2d at 976; FCI, 517 F. Supp. at 960. See also 9 U.S.C. § 10(d)
(1982).
113. In FCI, the court stated that the policy of the federal courts was to avoid sub-
stituting their opinions for the conclusions of the judges chosen by the parties. See FCI,
517 F. Supp. at 960.
114. See id.; see also Amoco, 490 F. Supp. at 37-38.
115. See Parsons, 508 F.2d at 977.
116. Several decisions indicate that only if the arbitrator acts irrationally will the
submission defense succeed. See, e.g., Amoco, 490 F. Supp. at 37-38 (holding that any
colorable justification will uphold the decision of the arbitrators); FCI, 517 F. Supp. at
960 (following the irrationality test).
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The submission defense is the only defense that permits a
federal court to enforce an arbitrator's award partially by divid-
ing it into permissible and impermissible sections. 1 7 "Permissi-
ble" is defined as that portion of the award that had been prop-
erly submitted to the arbitral tribunal.118 Permissible issues
would be issues that were explicitly included in an arbitral
clause or issues submitted to arbitration with the consent of all
the parties."' Once a court has determined a section of an award
is permissible, it is enforceable subject to the other defenses.
Allowing partial recognition of an arbitral award reflects the
pro-enforcement policy of the Convention. 20 Nevertheless, no
federal court has yet divided an award. The courts have instead
endeavored to uphold the awards in their entirety. 12' The policy
behind this action is a desire to carry out the congressional in-
tent, which was to construe procedures for enforcing foreign ar-
bitral awards liberally.'22 If a party opposed to the enforcement
of an award should ever prove that an arbitral tribunal had ex-
ceeded its power by deciding issues not submitted, the party
seeking recognition could recover at least that part of his award
which had been properly submitted.
D. The Binding Defense
An arbitral award may not be recognized if a party opposing
recognition can prove that the award is not binding on the par-
ties "under the law of which, that award was made.' 23 Recogni-
tion may also be denied if the award which was binding has been
set aside by competent authority of the originating country or of
the country whose law governed the arbitration. 24 When this
117. See supra note 107.
118. Parsons, 508 F.2d at 976.
119. See supra note 107.
120. Convention, supra note 1, art. V(1)(c).
121. See, e.g., Parsons, 508 F.2d at 976; FCI, 517 F. Supp. at 960; Amoco, 490 F.
Supp. at 38.
122. See Parsons, 508 F.2d at 976; FCI, 517 F. Supp. at 960.
123. Convention, supra, note 1, art. V(i)(e). This article provides that the binding
defense may be invoked if "[t]he award has not yet become binding on the parties, or
has been set aside or suspended by a competent authority of the country in which, or
under the law of which, that award was made." Id. This provision clearly authorizes the
enforcing court to research the law under which the arbitral award was rendered.
124. Id.
1984]
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defense is raised, it requires a court to identify and interpret the
law of a foreign nation.
In Fertilizer Corp. of India v. IDI Management, Inc.
(FCI),1'25 two parties entered a contract to build a ni-
trophosphate plant in India. After the plant was built, a dispute
arose over the quantity of daily production. The dispute was
submitted to the International Chamber of Commerce for settle-
ment pursuant to an arbitration clause in the parties' original
agreement.'2 The arbitrators awarded Fertilizer Corp. of India
(FCI) damages. FCI then brought an enforcement proceeding in
the United States. IDI argued against recognition alleging that it
was not binding under Indian law because it had not yet been
reviewed for errors by an Indian court. 27
After a thorough investigation of Indian law, the FCI court
determined that the award was binding.' The court reasoned
that an "award will be considered 'binding' . . . if no further
recourse may be had to another arbitral tribunal. . .. The fact
that recourse may be had to a court of law does not prevent the
award from being binding."' 2 9 This logical standard is favorable
to a party seeking recognition, and it offers a helpful guideline
for the courts in their difficult task of interpreting a foreign na-
tion's civil procedure. 30 Using this simple test consistently, the
federal courts will further the goal of certainty and liberal en-
forcement of foreign arbitral awards.13'
A provision related to the binding defense is found in article
VI of the Convention, which permits a federal court to adjourn
its proceeding to recognize a foreign arbitral award when an ap-
plication to set aside the award has been made in the originating
country. 3 2 This provision is a safety device because it avoids the
125. 517 F. Supp. 948 (S.D. Ohio 1981).
126. Id. at 949-50.
127. Id. at 956. IDI argued that the award was not binding until both parties ex-
hausted all possibilities for judicial review. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 958 (quoting G. Aksen, American Arbitration Accession Arrives in the
Age of Aquarius: United States Implements United Nations Convention or the Recog-
nition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards. 3 Sw. U.L. REv. 1, 11 (1971)).
130. Id. at 956-58.
131. As of this writing, only the FCI court has spoken on this issue.
132. Convention, supra note 1, art. VI. That article states:
If an application for the setting aside or suspension of an award has been
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situation of having an award which is enforceable in the United
States, but no longer valid in its country of origin.
In FCI, an application to overturn the arbitral award was
pending in India. 3 3 The party opposing recognition requested
that the court adjourn its decision under article VI. Although
the FCI court noted that article VI appeared "to be an unfet-
tered grant of discretion,"" it felt constrained by the goals of
the Convention and the intention of Congress. The motivation
was to encourage the recognition of commercial arbitration
awards by liberalizing enforcement procedures, limiting de-
fenses, and placing the burden of proof on the party opposing
enforcement.13 5 Furthermore, "parochial" decisions were to be
avoided because they would frustrate these purposes. " 6 In spite
of the strong policy favoring enforcement - thereby limiting
an enforcing court's power to adjourn - the court was fearful
of an inconsistent verdict. Thus it suspended its decision until
the Indian courts decided the application.3 7
E. The Nonarbitrable Defense
An issue is nonarbitrablel" if, according to the laws of the
country where enforcement is being sought, the dispute underly-
made to a competent authority referred to in article V(1)(e), the authority before
which the award is sought to be relied upon may, if it considers it proper, adjourn
the decision on the enforcement of the award and may also, on the application of
the party claiming enforcement of the award, order the other party to give suita-
ble security.
"Adjourn" is defined as "to postpone action of a convened court or legislative body until
another time." BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY, 39 (rev. 5th ed. 1979).
133. 517 F. Supp. at 961-62.
134. See id. at 961. The court noted the lack of any previous decisions on this mat-
ter from which it could draw standards. Id.
135. Id. (citing Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 520 n.15 (1974)). Scherk
involved a sales contract between a German citizen and an Illinois corporation. This con-
tract contained an arbitration clause, which Scherk attempted to invoke when a dispute
arose. Alberto-Culver instead began a contract action in federal court. Scherk, 417 U.S.
at 508-09. The Supreme Court held the arbitration clause must be enforced in light of
the strong congressional policy favoring enforcement. Id. at 520 n.15. This policy has
been consistently followed. See text accompanying notes 87-90.
136. FCI, 517 F. Supp. at 961 (citing Parsons, 508 F.2d at 973).
137. Id. at 962.
138. The relevant portion of the Convention states that "[r]ecognition and enforce-
ment of an arbitral award may also be refused if the competent authority in the country
where recognition and enforcement is sought finds that:
19841
19
PACE LAW REVIEW
ing the arbitral award was a matter incapable of being settled by
arbitration. " 9 A federal court may deny recognition and enforce-
ment of an award if the facts necessary to establish this defense
are proven. A defense of nonarbitrability differs from the previ-
ous defenses discussed in two ways: first, the court may raise it
sua sponte,"0 and second, the court focuses upon the specific
dispute that was the subject of the arbitration.14 1
To be successful with this defense, a party must prove that
the enforcing nation attaches a special national interest to the
dispute which makes it incapable of being settled by arbitra-
tion.142 The special national interest must be more than "inci-
dentally" involved in the dispute for the court to find the dis-
pute was nonarbitrable. s14  For example, the mere fact that "acts
of the United States are somehow implicated in a case," does
not make it a case of special national interest. 1 4
A special national interest was found in Libyan American
Oil Co. v. Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahira
(LIAMCO)." 5 In LIAMCO, an oil company sought recognition of
its arbitral award for inadequate compensation after Libya na-
tionalized the oil holdings of the Libyan American Oil Co.
(LIAMCO). The LIAMCO court stated that under article
V(2)(a)," the issue for decision involved choosing the procedure
(a) The subject matter of the difference is not capable of settlement by arbitration
under the law of that country." Convention, supra note 1, art. V(2)(a).
139. See, e.g., Parsons, 508 F.2d at 974 (stating that an example of a nonarbitrable
dispute under United States law is a dispute involving an antitrust claim).
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 975.
143. Id. See also American Safety Equip. v. J.P. Maguire Co., 391 F.2d 821 (2d Cir.
1968) (domestic arbitration case; incidental connection with national policy is not neces-
sarily nonarbitrable).
144. Parsons, 508 F.2d at 975. Parsons involved a contract dispute which was fur-
ther entangled when the Six Day War of 1967 broke out in the Middle East. The Par-
sons court rejected the nonarbitrability claim because it found that severance of rela-
tions with Egypt was not a special national interest. Id. The court also discussed the
possibility that a dispute arising in a foreign context may require a narrower reading of
nonarbitrability (which would be subject to the strong pro-enforcement policy set down
in Scherk v. Alberto-Culver, 417 U.S. 506 (1974)) than one arising in a domestic context.
See id.
145. 482 F. Supp. 1175 (D.D.C. 1980), vacated without opinion, 684 F.2d 1032 (D.C.
Cir. 1981).
146. See supra note 138.
[Vol. 5:151
20http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol5/iss1/5
ARBITRAL AWARDS
to use to compensate LIAMCO for its loss of assets as a result of
Libya's nationalization.4 7  There were two options availa-
ble - the arbitrator's determination or the nationalization laws
of Libya.14 8 The district court held that it could not have or-
dered arbitration on this matter originally because "it would
have been compelled to rule on the validity of the Libyan na-
tionalization law."4 9 When faced with deciding the legitimacy of
the acts of a foreign sovereign, a federal court will invoke a long
held policy of judicial abstention. 50 The district court refused to
recognize the award because nationalization is a classic example
of an issue subject to this doctrine.'"' This decision would have
been the only time that a foreign arbitral award had been re-
fused recognition under the Convention in the United States. On
appeal, however, the circuit court vacated the LIAMCO decision
without stating a reason.' 2 Thus, the status of this defense is
still unclear in the United States.
The nonarbitrable defense is always subject to the consider-
ations of competing policies. On one hand, the federal courts
strongly favor enforcement of foreign arbitral awards.'15  On the
other hand, enforcement of awards that involve issues of special
national interest cannot be resolved through arbitration.'" As
one court has suggested, the test for nonarbitrability will proba-
bly be "of an ad hoc nature."'5 5
147. LIAMCO, 482 F. Supp. at 1178.
148. Id. at 1179-80.
149. Id. These laws abrogated the prior agreements between the disputants.
150. Id. The court indicated that "[e]very sovereign state is bound to respect the
independence of every other sovereign state, and the courts of one country will not sit in
judgment on the acts of the government of another, done within its own territory." Id.
151. Id.
152. LIAMCO, 684 F.2d 1032 (D.C. Cir. 1981), vacating without opinion 482 F.
Supp. 1175 (D.D.C. 1980). While appeal was pending, the Libyan American Oil Co.
(LIAMCO) and Libya had reached a settlement. The court of appeals under pressure
from the American Arbitration Association and other groups, which had filed amici cu-
riae briefs, vacated the lower court's decision without an opinion. See 7 Y.B. COM. ARE.
382 (1982).
153. See Scherk, 417 U.S. at 506.
154. See Parsons, 508 F.2d at 974-75.
155. Id. at 975.
1984]
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F. The Public Policy Defense
The public policy defense1" is the vaguest of all the de-
fenses allowed by the Convention, and because of this it has the
greatest potential to defeat the liberal enforcement policy of the
Convention.167 The federal courts have recognized the threat
that this defense has posed158 and have defined it narrowly. It
includes only the very basic notions of morality and justice of
the United States.159 This defense has been the most frequently
litigated of the defenses, which indicates that it is viewed as a
means to deny enforcement of a foreign arbitral award.160
The guidelines for the public policy defense, as well as for
many of the other defenses, were developed by the Second Cir-
cuit in Parsons & Whittemore Overseas Co. v. Societe Generale
de L' Industrie du Papier.61 In Parsons, an American company
appealed the recognition of a foreign arbitral award rendered in
favor of Societe Generale, an Egyptian representative. 62 The
parties had entered into a contract for the construction and
management of a paperboard mill in Egypt." This agreement
provided for the arbitration of all disputes during the duration
of the contract. A dispute arose and was submitted to an arbi-
tration panel.1" The panel decided in favor of Societe Generale
and awarded damages. 6
In contesting enforcement of the award in the United
States, Parsons alleged that its refusal to continue performance
of the contract was in keeping with the foreign policy of the
156. Convention, supra note 1, art. V(2)(b) provides: "The recognition or enforce-
ment of the award would be contrary to the public policy of that country."
157. Unlike the other defenses, this defense may also be raised by the court. Con-
vention, supra note 1 art. V(2).
158. See infra text accompanying notes 161-91.
159. Parsons, 508 F.2d at 974.
160. See A. VAN DEN BERG, supra note 2, at 366. See also infra text accompanying
notes 161-91.
161. 508 F.2d 969 (2d Cir. 1974).
162. Id. at 970-71.
163. Id. at 971.
164. Id. at 972. When the 1967 Arab-Israeli War began, Egypt severed ties with the
United States. Parsons removed its work force and considered this a postponement of
the contract which would be protected by the force majeure clause, which excuses a
delay in performance due to causes beyond the parties' control. The Egyptians inter-
preted Parsons' action as a default and sought damages. Id.
165. See id. (Nearly $400,000 was at stake.).
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United States.166 Parsons argued that to enforce this award
would therefore contravene the public policy of the United
States. 67 The Second Circuit held that the public policy defense
should be narrowly construed and that recognition would be de-
nied only when enforcement of the award "would violate the fo-
rum state's most basic notions of morality and justice."'1 8 The
court rejected Parsons' public policy defense because it viewed
severance of ties with Egypt as a matter of politics rather than
public policy. It stated that the defense was not a parochial de-
vice which is available to protect the political interests of a na-
tion.6 9 This defense "was not meant to enshrine the vagaries of
international politics under the rubric of 'public policy.' ,,17O
This decision was based on the pro-enforcement purpose of the
Convention,17 ' which was recognized by the Supreme Court in
Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co. 7 2 The most important factor in
Parsons was the fear that a restrictive decision by an American
court would result in negative repercussions by foreign courts
that were presented with requests to enforce arbitral awards
rendered in the United States. 7 3
Parties opposed to recognition of a foreign arbitral award
have attempted to incorporate a broad range of claims under the
public policy defense. For example, in Biotronik Mess-und
Therapiegeraete GmbH & Co. v. Medford Medical Instrument
Co., 174 the defendant claimed that the party who prevailed at
166. See supra note 164.
167. Parsons, 508 F.2d at 972-73.
168. Id. at 974.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. See supra text accompanying notes 87-89.
172. 417 U.S. 506. In Scherk, the Supreme Court commented:
The goal of the Convention, and the principal purpose underlying American adop-
tion and implementation of it, was to encourage the recognition and enforcement
of commercial arbitration agreements in international contracts and to unify the
standards by which agreements to arbitrate are observed and arbitral awards are
enforced in the signatory countries.
Id. at 520 n.15.
173. Parsons, 508 F.2d at 973-74. The Second Circuit noted that "considerations of
Reciprocity - considerations given express recognition in the Convention it-
self - counsel courts to invoke the public policy defense with caution lest foreign courts
frequently accepted it as a defense to enforcement of arbitral awards rendered in the
United States." Id.
174. 415 F. Supp. 133 (D.N.J. 1976). Biotronik involved a contract for the distribu-
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the arbitration hearing had committed fraud in his presentation
to the arbitration panel and, therefore, to recognize the award
would violate the public policy of the enforcing state. 175 In deny-
ing the public policy defense in Biotronik, the district court ad-
hered to the precedent established by Parsons.1 7' Again, the par-
amount consideration was a fear of reprisals by foreign courts."
The public policy defense was also examined in Transma-
rine Seaways Corp. of Monrovia v. Marc Rich & Co. 17 8 The dis-
trict court denied two of Marc Rich's claims that were asserted
as violations of public policy. Marc Rich charged that one of the
arbitrators had an improper financial relationship with Trans-
marine. 179 The court found no impropriety.180 Marc Rich also al-
leged that there had been duress in contracting.181 The district
court held that the existence of duress is clearly a matter of pub-
lic policy, and if it were established, the court would deny recog-
nition of an award. 82 The facts, however, did not establish a
valid duress defense because Marc Rich had many options
available. 8 3
Public policy has also been asserted to cover claims of arbi-
trator bias,8 to invoke judicial estoppel, s 5 and to attack the in-
tion of pacemakers. The dispute arose over several shipments of the pacemakers manu-
factured by Biotronik and to be distributed by Medford. Id. at 135.
175. Id. at 137.
176. Id. at 140.
177. Id. at 139 (citing Parsons, 508 F.2d at 973, which expressed the fear that for-
eign courts could react against awards rendered in the United States if federal courts
became reckless in their interpretations of the public policy defense).
178. 480 F. Supp. 352 (S.D.N.Y. 1979). Plaintiff was a ship owner who sued to en-
force an arbitral award rendered in New York. The dispute arose over the completion of
a charter agreement.
179. The allegation was that there was an income-producing relationship between
the arbitrator and the winning party at arbitration. See id. at 357-58.
180. Id. at 358. The court found the alleged relationship to be too tenuous to be any
cause for concern. Also, due to the nature of the maritime industry and the scarcity of
experienced arbitrators in this field, some overlap was considered unavoidable. Id.
181. Id. at 358-61.
182. Id. at 358-59. The standard for proving duress involves showing that the
party's will was overbourne so as to lose his options. Id.
183. Id. at 359-61 (Marc Rich had many options open; there was no duress).
184. See FCI, 517 F. Supp. 948 (S.D. Ohio 1981) (in which arbitrator had previously
represented the winning party).
185. See Waterside Ocean Navigation Co. v. International Navigation Ltd., 737 F.2d
150 (2d Cir. 1984) (recognizing awards rendered in London).
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terest awarded on a recovery. 186 All of these claims were denied
because they did not reach the very strict and unwavering stan-
dard of having threatened the most basic notions of morality
and justice of the enforcing state. 187
This defense was successfully used in Laminoirs-Trefileries-
Cableries de Lens, S.A. v. Southwire Co.'88 Laminoirs involved a
sales contract for galvanized steel wire. A dispute arose over the
fixing of the price and was submitted to the International Cham-
ber of Commerce.'89 Southwire alleged that the "arbitrators er-
roneously adopted the French legal rate of interest on the
amounts due" and that this violated the enforcing forum's pub-
lic policy because that interest rate was excessive. 90 The Lami-
noirs court agreed and refused to enforce that part of the arbi-
trator's award, holding that an award of interest that is penal in
nature clearly violates public policy. 9
Parsons and subsequent decisions interpret the public pol-
icy defense to be a very limited one. In doing so, federal courts
refuse to allow the development of a vague, standardless defense
which would hinder the goals of the Convention. This restrictive
interpretation, followed in all later decisions, 92 has been an ef-
fective means to support the pro-enforcement policy of the Con-
vention. Moreover, the potential "Pandora's box" found in a
broad and imprecise public policy defense has never been
opened by the courts.
186. See Laminoirs-Trefileries-Cableries de Lens, S.A. v. Southwire Co., 484 F.
Supp. 1063 (N.D. Ga. 1980). Southwire claimed the interest on the award was usurious.
Southwire had agreed to buy galvanized steel wire from Laiminoirs. The agreement had
an arbitration clause. A dispute arose over the price, and it was submitted to the ICC for
settlement.
187. See Waterside, 737 F.2d at 152; Laminoirs, 484 F. Supp. at 1068; FCI, 517 F.
Supp. at 953.
188. 484 F. Supp. 1063 (N.D. Ga. 1980).
189. Id. at 1066.
190. Id.
191. Id. at 1069.
192. See supra text accompanying notes 174-91.
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G. Miscellaneous Defenses
1. Untapped Defenses
Two defenses specifically enumerated in article V of the
Convention have not yet been raised in an enforcement proceed-
ing in the federal courts. One defense requires a review of
whether the parties have the capacity to enter into an agreement
and whether the resulting agreement is valid.193 The other de-
fense allows a party to question whether the composition and
the procedure of the arbitration tribunal was in accordance with
the parties' agreement or the law of the originating nation.'
These two defenses require the enforcing court to review the
process that preceded the award. When these defenses are
finally raised in an enforcement hearing, it is probable that they
will be strictly construed, as have all of the other Convention
defenses.
2. Reciprocity
An imaginative defense was presented in FCP9 by the
party opposing recognition of the foreign arbitral award. This
party claimed that the country where the award originated
would not grant reciprocity to awards made in the United
States. 196 It proposed that the United States should therefore re-
fuse to recognize and enforce an award rendered in that country
(India). The court examined the requirements for reciprocity
193. See Convention, supra note 1, art. V(1)(a). This provision states:
The parties to the agreement referred to in article II were, under the law applica-
ble to them, under some incapacity, or the said agreement is not valid under the
law to which the parties have subjected it or, failing any indication thereon, under
the law of the country where the award was made.
Id.
194. See Convention, supra note 1, art. V(1)(d). This provision provides that "It]he
composition of the arbitral authority or the arbitral procedure was not in accordance
with the agreement of the parties, or, failing such agreement, was not in accordance with
the law of the country where the arbitration took place." Id.
195. 517 F. Supp. 948 (S.D. Ohio 1981).
196. Id. at 952. IDI argued that Indian courts would not have enforced that arbitral
award if it had been in favor of IDI and rendered in the United States. IDI also alleged
that the Indian courts had narrowly defined the commercial relationship requirement of
the Convention. Id.
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and denied the defense.197
In general, federal courts focus upon two requirements to
determine if reciprocity exists. First, the originating country
must be a signatory to the Convention, and second, the legal re-
lationship that gave rise to the dispute must be considered com-
mercial under the law of the United States.19 8 According to the
courts, as long as these conditions are met, the necessary reci-
procity is satisfied. The reason for this simple test, as always, is
the fear that a parochial decision would elicit restrictive deci-
sions from foreign courts denying enforcement of arbitral awards
made in the United States. 9 "
3. Procedural Tactics
An alleged failure to meet the venue requirements estab-
lished under the Convention 0 " has been used as an attempted
means to defeat recognition.2 0' The federal courts, however, find
little merit in denying an award on these grounds because the
venue requirements of the Convention are easily satisfied. Venue
lies where provided by agreement or where it would lie
normally.2 2
Motions for discovery have also been used in an attempt to
thwart a recognition proceeding. This tactic did not succeed in
Imperial Ethiopian Government v. Baruch-Foster Corp.203 The
Fifth Circuit characterized the request for discovery in the en-
forcement proceeding as a bad faith attempt to freeze the recog-
197. Id. at 953. The court found that the requirements of reciprocity were met. The
court also found that Indian courts were enforcing foreign awards made in favor of other
nationalities. Finally, there was the consideration that "United States courts should con-
strue exceptions narrowly lest foreign courts use holdings against application of the Con-
vention as a reason for refusing enforcement of awards made in the United States." Id.
198. See, e.g., FCI, 517 F. Supp. at 950; Audi Nsu Auto Union Aktienge-Sellschaft v.
Overseas Motors, 418 F. Supp. 982, 983 (E.D. Mich. 1976) (The contract involved the
import of foreign cars into the United States; a dispute arose and was arbitrated in Zu-
rich, Switzerland.).
199. See supra note 197.
200. See 9 U.S.C. § 204 (1982). To examine the text of the venue provision, see
supra note 73.
201. See Audi, 418 F. Supp. at 983-84 (denying the effort to defeat recognition be-
cause venue was clearly proper).
202. See 9 U.S.C. § 204 (1982). To examine the text of the venue provision, see
supra note 73.
203. 535 F.2d 334 (5th Cir. 1976).
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nition of an arbitral award.2
IV. Unresolved Issues
A. Applicability of the Defenses of the Federal Arbitration
Act
One of the major difficulties faced by the federal courts is
that of interpreting section 208 of title 9 which applies the Fed-
eral Arbitration Act's procedures to the enforcement of foreign
arbitral awards, except to the extent that the Act conflicts with
the Convention. 0 5 Although the Convention controls when any
conflict arises, 0e the federal courts have not been very clear in
their efforts to harmonize the Act with the Convention.
A major issue that remains to be decided is whether the de-
fenses of the Act 207 apply to the Convention. This ambiguity
permits parties who oppose recognition to delay what is sup-
posed to be an expedited procedure. An opposing party may in-
troduce defenses allowed under the Act, although they are not
part of the Convention at all. This procedure engenders delay,
and is compounded by uncertainty surrounding the differences
between the Convention and the Act.
The federal courts have not yet directly confronted this is-
204. Id. at 337. The opposing party failed to come forward with any evidence show-
ing its good faith in requesting discovery at a recognition proceeding. Thus, the court
surmised that this was merely a delay tactic. Id.
205. 9 U.S.C. § 208 (1982).
206. See id.
207. The Act's defenses are found in 9 U.S.C. § 10 (1982), which states:
In either of the following cases the United States court in and for the district
wherein the award was made may make an order vacating the award upon the
application of any party to the arbitration -
(a) Where the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or undue means.
(b) Where there was evident partiality or corruption in the arbitrators' or ei-
ther of them.
(c) Where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing to postpone
the hearing, upon sufficient cause shown, or in refusing to hear evidence pertinent
and material to the controversy; or of any other misbehavior by which the rights
of any party have been prejudiced.
(d) Where the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly executed
them that a mutual, final, and definite award upon the subject matter submitted
was not made.
(e) Where an award is vacated and the time within which the agreement re-
quired the award to be made has not expired the court may, in its discretion,
direct a rehearing by the arbitrators.
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sue. Rather, when a party raises one of the defenses under the
Act, the court will first decide whether the facts presented con-
stitute a defense under the Act. The courts so far have found
none of the attempts to assert defenses allowed under the Act to
satisfy the Act's standards. This result is demonstrated in Par-
sons & Whittemore Overseas Co. v. Societe Generale de
L'Industrie du Papier.20 8 The Second Circuit refused to imply
the defense of manifest disregard of the law,209 which is allowed
by section ten of the Act.21 It held that the facts did not estab-
lish the defense, and therefore, the issue of whether the defense
was applicable under the Convention was avoided.2 1 1 This result
has been repeated in many later decisions.2 12
Eventually, either Congress or the courts must clearly de-
cide what defenses, if any, of the Act are included under the
Convention. Avoiding the decision does not comport with the
goals of providing a simple recognition and enforcement proce-
dure. The most appropriate decision, in keeping with the pro-
enforcement policy of the Convention and Congress,1 would be
to amend section 208 or add a new section which clearly states
that no defenses outside of those enumerated in the Convention
are available in a foreign arbitration enforcement proceeding.
The federal courts would still be able to look to cases interpret-
ing the defenses of the Act for guidance, but opposing parties
would no longer be able to delay the recognition proceeding.
208. 508 F.2d 969 (2d Cir. 1974).
209. Id. at 974-76.
210. See supra note 207.
211. Id. at 977.
212. See, e.g., Andros Compania Maritima, S.A. v. Marc Rich & Co., 579 F.2d 691,
699 (2d Cir. 1978) (refusing to decide if failure to disclose a prior relationship between
the arbitrator and the winning party was a defense under the Convention); Biotronik
Mess-und Therapiegeraete GmbH & Co. v. Medford Medical Instrument Co., 415 F.
Supp. 133, 140 (D.N.J. 1976) (finding no fraud in the procurement of the award and
therefore refusing to decide whether fraud is available as a defense under the
Convention).
213. See Scherk v. Alberto-Culver, 417 U.S. 506, 520 n.15 (1974); Parsons & Whitte-
more Overseas Co. v. Societe Generale de L'Industrie du Papier, 508 F.2d 969, 973 (2d
Cir. 1974).
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B. Jurisdiction over Awards Rendered in the United States.
The federal courts have also struggled with defining the
scope of the Convention's jurisdiction. Essentially the issue is
whether the Convention applies to arbitral awards rendered in
the United States when they involve a foreign party. The south-
ern district of New York, in Transmarine Seaways Corp. of
Monrovia v. Marc Rich & Co.,, 214 applied the Convention to two
foreign corporations who had their dispute arbitrated in New
York. Yet, in the same year, another judge in the same district
court did not decide this jurisdictional issue.21 5 The issue seems
to have been resolved, at least in the Second Circuit, by
Bergesen v. Joseph Muller Corp.'1 which applied the Conven-
tion to an award that involved foreign entities, but was made in
New York.21 7 In Bergesen, the Second Circuit read the jurisdic-
tional criteria of the Convention 218 broadly, holding that the
Convention applies to awards "made within the legal framework
of another country, e.g., pronounced in accordance with foreign
law or involving parties domiciled or having their principal place
of business outside the enforcing jurisdiction. ' 21' The Second
Circuit stated that its expansive interpretation was consistent
with the purpose of the Convention: to encourage the recogni-
tion and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards.2 It found ad-
ditional support in the legislative history of section 202 of title
214. 480 F. Supp. 352 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
215. See Amoco Overseas Oil Co. v. Astir Navigation Co., 490 F. Supp. 32 (S.D.N.Y.
1979). The dispute arose under a charter agreement and the arbitration occurred in New
York. The court did not decide whether the Convention or the Act applied, holding that
the standards of art. V and §§ 9-10 were equivalent. Id. at 36. A similar result occurred
in Andros Compania, 579 F.2d at 699 n.11. Prior to Andros Compania, the same circuit
refused to decide the issue and confirmed an award under the Act. See I/S Stavborg v.
National Metal Converters, Inc., 500 F.2d 424, 426 n.2 (2d Cir. 1974) (dispute over pay-
ment of freight due; court noting split over jurisdictional question).
216. 710 F.2d 928 (2d Cir. 1983).
217. See id. at 932. This case involved a Norwegian shipowner and a Swiss company.
The dispute arose over a charter and the arbitration was held in New York. The ship-
owner (Bergesen) won and sought enforcement. The district judge held that the Conven-
tion does apply to "awards rendered in the United States involving foreign interests."
Bergesen v. Joseph Muller Corp., 548 F. Supp. 650, 652 (S.D.N.Y. 1983). The Second
Circuit affirmed this judgment.
218. Convention, supra note 1, art. I.
219. Bergesen, 710 F.2d at 932.
220. Id. (citing Scherk, 417 U.S. at 520 n.15).
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9,21 which states that the Convention applies to relationships
that have a "reasonable relation with one or more foreign
states."222
At least in the Second Circuit, there is a clear way to mea-
sure the scope of the Convention's jurisdiction.223 In the absence
of statutory guidance, other circuits would do well to follow this
test. Extending the Convention to govern awards made in the
enforcing state is acceptable because it adheres to the principal
design of the Convention. If the other circuits do not adopt the
Bergesen test, another problem must be addressed. The Act con-
tains a one year statute of limitations; the Convention provides
three years to enforce an award.2 4 Thus, if a party seeking en-
forcement mistakenly invokes the Convention in a circuit which
will not apply its provisions, that party could lose the opportu-
nity to enforce his award in the United States. Congress needs
to act to avoid such a consequence, which is at odds with the
precepts of the Convention.
V. Current Developments
In the short span of fourteen years since the Convention
was adopted, the federal courts have developed clear trends in
implementing this law. On the one hand, the jurisdiction and
scope of the Convention has consistently been expanded. At the
same time, the courts have adopted a pro-enforcement policy,
narrowly construing all of the defenses allowed by the
Convention.22 5
The expansive application of the Convention is demon-
strated in several divergent situations. In Ipitrade Interna-
tional, S.A. v. Federal Republic of Nigeria,26 a federal court for
the first time applied the Convention to reorganize an arbitral
221. 9 U.S.C. § 202 (1982).
222. Bergesen, 710 F.2d at 933.
223. See supra text accompanying note 219.
224. Compare 9 U.S.C. § 9 (1982) (providing one year in which to bring a proceed-
ing) with 9 U.S.C. § 207 (1982) (providing three years to bring a proceeding).
225. See supra text accompanying notes 99-191.
226. 465 F. Supp. 824 (D.D.C. 1978). A dispute arose over the sale and purchase of
cement. Nigeria refused to participate in the arbitration, relying upon its sovereign im-
munity. No other defenses were available nor were any asserted, and the award was
recognized.
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award rendered against a foreign sovereign. Although Nigeria
had opposed recognition, relying on a defense of sovereign im-
munity, the Ipitrade court found that the sovereign's immunity
had been waived by a prior agreement to arbitrate. s7 The Sec-
ond Circuit in Fotochrome, Inc. v. Copal Co.,2 2s determined that
the power of the bankruptcy court to freeze the assets of a com-
pany did not preclude recognition of a foreign arbitral award
previously rendered against that same company. Bergeson
2 19
represents another step in the expanding reach of the Conven-
tion. It resolved that the Convention is applicable to arbitral
awards rendered in the United States." '
In addition to an expansive interpretation of the Conven-
tion's jurisdiction, the federal courts have strictly construed its
defenses to achieve liberal enforcement of arbitral awards. This
approach was reinforced in La Societe Nationale pour La
Recherche (Sonatrach) v. Shaheen Natural Resources Co.," '
which considered many objections to recognition. Sonatrach in-
volved a contract for the sale of crude oil to Shaheen, an Illinois
corporation. When a dispute arose over payment, Sonatrach,
pursuant to an arbitration clause in the contract, commenced a
proceeding before the International Chamber of Commerce. The
arbitrators awarded over four million dollars with interest to
Sonatrach.5
The Sonatrach court began by noting that a party seeking
227. Id. at 825-27.
228. 517 F.2d 512 (2d Cir. 1975). The contract in Fotochrome involved the manufac-
ture of cameras by Copal and the purchase and distribution of them by Fotochrome. A
dispute arose with each party accusing the other of breaching the contracts. After arbi-
tration was held in Japan, Fotochrome filed for bankruptcy in the United States. The
issue in Fotochrome was the ability of the bankruptcy court to enjoin this enforcement
proceeding. The court enforced the award because of: (1) the strong policy in favor of
arbitration, id. at 516, (2) the lack of personal jurisdiction by the bankruptcy court over
Copal, id., and (3) the absence of defenses allowed by the Convention. Id. at 518.
For a further discussion of the conflict between the Convention and the bankruptcy
courts, see Westbrook, The Coming Encounter: International Arbitration and Bank-
ruptcy, 67 MNn. L. Rav. 595 (1983).
229. 710 F.2d 928 (2d Cir. 1983).
230. See supra notes 214-24 and accompanying text.
231. 585 F. Supp. 57 (S.D.N.Y. 1983), aff'd, 733 F.2d 260 (2d Cir. 1984). The plain-
tiff, a seller of oil, sought recognition and enforcement of an arbitral award rendered in
Geneva, Switzerland.
232. Id. at 58-60.
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recognition had only to comply with minimal procedural re-
quirements. 23 3 Furthermore, the court acknowledged its limited
power to review an arbitral decision.23 ' The focus of its analysis
was two substantive defenses raised by Shaheen. Shaheen stated
that the contract contained a restriction on the resale of goods.
It alleged this to be a violation of the antitrust laws of the
United States and therefore unenforceable as a matter of public
policy. 23 5 Following the pattern of previous cases,'3" the court re-
jected this claim, holding that public policy had not been vio-
lated because notions of morality and justice had not been
offended. 3 "
Shaheen also asserted the reciprocity defense, claiming that
an Algerian court would not have enforced an award which was
in its favor.2 8 The court questioned whether reciprocity is a de-
fense under the Convention but found it unnecessary to reach
this issue because there was no evidence that Algeria would not
enforce an arbitral award in favor of non-nationals.2 9 The Sona-
trach court concluded by noting "the goal and the purpose of
the Convention ... is. . .to expedite the recognition and en-
forcement of arbitration awards.2 140 Sonatrach made a contribu-
tion to this objective: it summarized many of the pro-enforce-
ment policies of the federal courts.
VI. Conclusion
The federal courts have interpreted and implemented the
Convention in order to achieve a more favorable process through
which foreign arbitral awards may be recognized and enforced in
the United States. The Convention has succeeded in encourag-
233. Id. at 59. See supra notes 79-86 and accompanying text.
234. Id.
235. Id. at 60. Traditionally, antitrust claims used as a defense to a contract action
have not been viewed with favor. Id.
236. See id. at 61 (citing Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506 (1974); Parsons
& Whittemore Overseas Co. v. Societe Generale de L'Industrie du Papier, 508 F.2d 969
(2d Cir. 1974) (strictly construes the public policy defense).
237. Id. The court noted that this claim did not "touch 'the forum state's most basic
notions of morality and justice.'" Id.
238. Id. at 62.
239. Id. The court relied upon affidavits in Sonatrach's motions.
240. Id. at 13 (citing Imperial Ethiopian Gov't v. Baruch-Foster Corp., 535 F.2d 334,
335 (5th Cir. 1976)).
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ing the use of international commercial arbitration as a means to
settle disputes. This achievement will have even greater impact
when Congress, or the courts, resolve the troublesome issues
that remain.
Robert S. Matlin
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